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A serious shortage of.housing, particularly for low income persons, 
presently exists in Nairobi. Dwelling units are available only at rentals 
that seem very high relative to the standard of accommodation. Solution 
of this problem is receiving a very high priority by city officials and 
several imaginative proposals are now on the drawing boards. Experiments 
with timber and pre-cast concrete low-cost units are now being carried out, 
site-and-service schemes have been instituted, careful consideration is 
being given the "squatter problem", and some urban redevelopment projects 
are planned for the near future. The goal of the city planners is clear: 
provide the best possible housing for low income persons in the most 
economic manner. 
So far, several lines of policy have been used. The principal tool 
for solving the problem has been provision of city-council financed dwelling 
units. At the moment there exists a waiting list of more than 30,000 
persons who want to occupy city-council units and it is planned to push. 
forward with maximum speed in increasing the number of such units. However, 
the rate of expansion is constrained by lack of funds and ability to 
execute complex projects. Introduction of site-and-service schemes 
(Kariobangi is the principal one) have been designed to -ease these con-
straints, as city council is required to provide only the plots and basic 
services and-private individuals construct the actual dwelling units. 
However, there has been considerable dismay over the growth of "landlordism" 
in the Kariobangi scheme and this calls'for some rethinking of the 
desirability of such projects. Considerations of equity have called forth 
policies of keeping rentals on city-council units at a "fair price" and 
the introduction of rent-control legislation. 
The purpose of this paper is to point out the ways in which various 
objectives and policies may be conflicting, to illustrate the dimensions 
of the problem with concrete reference to the proposed Pumwani redevelop-
ment scheme, and to suggest some criteria for policy in the future. 
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. ': tot.- The Market Solution v/i'-- • 
By definition, 'Scarcity of housing means that the demand for dwell-
ing units is large"relative to supply. There are several ways of ration-
ing this scarce supply. Each'has different implications for real income 
distribution arid for the future stock of housing. Let us begin by examin-
irig the way in which a free market might be used to allocate housing. 
The first point to be made is that if rentals are determined by . 
market forces rents will be high for only one reason — scarcity of housing. 
The market will allocate housing units to those who are willing to pay the 
highest rental. People who can afford to pay less (or who are unwilling 
to spend a large fraction of their income on rent) will therefore occupy 
less desirable housing than will wealthier persons or those who place 
a higher priority on good housing. Their housing will be situated farther 
from employment centers (although the lower rents will tend to be offset 
partly by higher transport costs), be of lower quality, and more crowded. 
The best solution to the problem for many poor people will be to "squat" — 
this will provide some shelter at the lowest cost available to these people. 
Of course, even some richer people may choose to squat if they wish to 
spend most of their income on other things than housing. 
It is important to note that the determination of who lives in the 
available stock of houses (and at what rent) is a separate, or at least 
separable, issue from that of ownership of the untis. Thus, if the City 
Council rented its units for the best price they could fetch, the occupancy 
pattern would be identical to the one that would occur if the same units were 
owned by private landlords seeking maximum profits. 
If housing units are privately owned and the market is allowed to 
work, and works "correctly", the high rents arising from relative scarcity 
of housing will make the building of new rental units very profitable to 
landlords. Given this incentive, landlords will expand the stock of housing 
— the higher the profits the faster will the stock rise. As the number 
of units expands, the relative scarcity will be eased (note that this 
requires expansion of units at a higher rate than new family formation, 
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including._iemigration into the urban.area) and rents and profits will 
be driven down.. . (Note that if rents did not fall, some units would fail 
to find tenants—competition -among landlords to fill these empty units 
would force the rents down. If one. doesn't find vacancies forcing rents 
down.because of growth of demand through urban growth, the implication is 
that scarcity of housing would; have been, greater., and rents would have 
risen, more had the stock of housing .not been expanded in response to the 
high prospective profits). This process will continue until the level of 
profitability of housing investments falls to that from investments in 
other activities such as. trade, transport, manufacturing etc. Subject to 
qualifications raised later, it will be Undesirable, to push housing expan-
sion past this point (so that profitability in housing would be less than 
elsewhere) since this implies that resources would be devoted to housing 
that could be used to satisfy more pressing wants elsewhere in the economy. 
This conclusion is based not just on some textbook abstraction about the 
need to equate rates of return on capital in different activities. What I 
am really saying is that it may be undesirable to try to make people consume 
more of one commodity, in this case housing, when they would prefer to consume 
more of something else given their limited income. 
II. DRAWBACKS TO THE MARKET SOLUTION 
Now there are several reasons why this idealized picture of how the 
market works may not be met in practice. First, due to impcrfect informa-
tion flows, rents may not actually reflect the true scarcity of housing. 
Ignorant tenants may pay more than they would if they were aware of rents 
in other localities. Landlords may charge less than they could for the 
same reason. Both of these are very real possibilities in that there is 
no organized -market for low-income housing in Nairobi.- - Information about 
vacancies and rents travel by word of mouth "and is often confined to channels 
embracing a single, ethnic or tribal group or sub group. 
Secondly, landlords may not respond to high rates of return by 
building more houses. They may be satisfied to consume their rental income. 
Or there may be the problem of credit availability which keeps landlords 
from building more houses. (This argument is rather weak, however, since if 
rental incomes are high there is potential for landlords to save a larger 
fraction of their income and invest it profitablyThis "has been the 
pattern of successful African industrialists and traders — those without 
credit have been if anything more successful in expanding than those with 
credit but lacking dedication to' business expansion or managerial ability 
to realize high profits.. See Marris on Kenya and Harris on Nigeria). 
There is some evidence that this has been the case in Kenya recently. 
Asians who provided a large share of private housing in the past and 
have been in the position to raise capital and build housing for rental 
have felt insufficiently secure to make such investments. The result is 
that high rates of return on existing houses has failed to elicit a rapid 
expansion of the stock of houses. 
Additional factors may serve to thwart the working of these market 
forces. Particularly, land suitable for housing development may not be 
made available to the would-be developer, or may be made available under 
conditions that do not make his tenure secure. Also, building codes and 
requirements may prevent types of construction that would be profitable. 
Before citing particular figures, one must also be careful to insure 
that one is measuring the rate of return on housing. A good part of the 
rental paid for a particular dwelling unit is. actually a payment for the 
convenience of the location (a rent for the land). For-instance, an 
individual working in the industrial area should be willing to pay a 
higher rental for room in Pumwani than he would pay for an identical room 
in Kariobangi since he will incur far.less expense (or exertion) for transpor-
tation to work each day. Therefore, the evidence, of a 100% rate of return 
on buildings in Pumwani is not evidence that such rates of return ,are 
available from buildings, alone"1". ... Kuch of the rental is in effect a loca-
tion or land rent which is being.received, by the-landlord, if there were 
a free market in land, it might well, be that Pumwani housing received a 
negative return since the land could be rented to someone who would, 
demolish the existing structures and use the land for other purposes and 
still find it possible to pay a higher rent for the use of the land alone 
than is presently paid by tenants for house and location in its present use. 
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If present landlords have been .favoured by the city council by being 
able to obtain- the land,- for 30/- per month, they are in effect receiving a 
gift from the; city council — the gift is the difference between the 30/-
and what, the council could receive for the land from the highest bidder at 
public auction. . The returns available from housing investment must 
be evaluated net of the. full market value of the land. My guess is that the 
returns are still high;. . Three alternatives face the city council: it could 
receive full economic rent from its land; sell it to the highest bidder 
in auction; or else continue to make it available on a "subsidized" basis 
to those that it finds deserving of public subsidy; It's far from clear 
that the present plotholders qualify for special'treatment although some 
2 of the old and infirm mentioned in the1 report may do so, 
These latter statements lead to the point that even if the market 
worked in the way suggested in the first paragraphs, it may still be 
socially undesirable. We ^ell may be unhappy to note that people with high 
incomes are able to get the best housing in the most desirable locations. 
We might want to distribute housing on some basis other than earnings. This 
is one of the usual justifications for rent control or for public 
authorities to build, housing and let it for less than would be received in 
an open market (note that waiting lists for city council houses is 
sufficient evidence for concluding that this policy is being followed by 
Nairobi City Council). This, of coursemeans that there is an implicit 
subsidy given to'individuals who obtain rent-controlled units or city-
council flats under these schemes. Note what the problem is — because 
there is an implicit: subsidy, more people would like to rent the rent-
controlled or city council units than-there are units. Therefore, waiting 
lists for. such units arise.. . "n: Nairobi there are more than 30,000 on 
3 
such waiting lists. How are individuals chosen from these lists of 
applicants? Clearly some kind -.of adr.iinist^ f.tive rationing device has 
to be used. What is disturbing:...in Nairobi is that it is far from clear 
that the administrative apparatus allocates the housing units to those 
who are most "socially deserving" of the subsidy. There is some evidence 
that the better-off individuals benefit- .most. The same will be true of 
privately owned units subject to rent control. The landlord, unable to 
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extract.the full market rent from prospective tenants, will also be induced 
to give more weight to various personal characteristics such as cleanly-
habits, few children, pretty wives, interesting conversation etc., many 
of which . are. associated with relatively high income and status. Thus .-
rent control may serve more to redistribute wealth from landlords to 
• \ 
wealthy (attractive) tenants than to help the poor and needy. At the same 
time fewer resources accrue to the council or landlords than would be 
the case in the absence of the subsidy/control. These resources could 
be used to expand the stock of housing more rapidly, thereby attenuating 
the housing shortage. Instead, they are diverted mainly to alternative 
consumption by tenants. The result is that people who are unable to gain 
access to subsidized/controlled units pay higher rents and have poorer 
living conditions than would otherwise be the. case. It is probably a 
safe assumption that the tenants who suffer from the present system of 
subsidies/rent controls are both poorer and more numerous than those who 
benefit. 
One must also consider the desires of the "socially deserving" (the 
poor?) for housing relative to other goods. It must be kept in mind that 
the principal problem of the poor is a lack of income — poor housing is 
just one manifestation of poverty. In this respect the Kariobangi experi-
ment is instructive. Plots were allocated to the "socially deserving" 
(destitute) on which they were to build decent-standard housing. Some credit 
was to be made available. Because land for building such houses is scarce 
in Nairobi these plots had value — considerably higher than the nominal 
charge imposed by the council. In some cases the individuals receiving 
plots sold them to potential landlords who were unable to obtain direct 
allocations and were willing to pay something approaching the "true"value 
of the land. In other cases the recipients of plots built houses which they 
rented out and then "squatted" in Matheri valley or elsewhere. The city 
council, feels that the project was a failure because the "socially deserving1 
did not end up in better housing, as had been intended. It should be 
carefully noted what happened here. The "socially deserving" were assisted. 
In effect, the city council gave them a gift of money equal to the difference 
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between the market price of the land and the nominal allocation charge. 
Some of these people used this gift to obtain better housing than they 
would otherwise'have had.: Others found that they had other uses for 
this gift that seemed more pressing to them than Kariobangi-standard housing. 
Therefore, they realized this gift (in cash or rents) and spent a smaller 
amount on housing than the council thought they should, and thereby had 
more money for such things as food, clothing, school fees etc. Again, 
the council helped these people — however, the individuals' views of the 
amount they should spend on housing vs. other goods, given their low levels 
of income, differed from the view of the council. It should also be noted 
that the Kariobangi scheme served to expand the stock of relatively low 
cost dwelling units in Nairobi and as such contributed to some easing of 
the housing shortage — rents from low income people must be lower by some 
small amount than they would have been had these houses never been built. 
The same applies to squatter dwellings; if they are bulldozed, there will be 
less housing units available and rents will be forced higher than they would 
be otherwise. Whether this indirect method is the best way of subsidizing 
the poor and adding to the stock of low-cost housing is not at all clear. 
III. THE PUMWANI REDEVELOPMENT SCHEME 
So much for general considerations. What is the relevance of all 
this for the proposed redevelopment of Pumwani? There are two not unconnected 
issues. First, what should be done with the land in Pumwani? Secondly, 
what should be done with and for the people who are presently living in the 
area? Economic analysis would suggest that the land should be made available 
for its highest valued use subject to some general- zoning control which would 
prevent uses that cause undue hardship or annoyance to adjoining property 
users, and which would provide for the use that would continue to be most 
valuable.in the light of projected patterns of growth of the city. The 
heart of the. argument for turning land to its highest valued use is that the 
total land in Nairobi will be then used most efficiently. A subsidiary argument 
is that if land is transferred from low to high value use there will be a 
net gain to the economy. • .It will be1 possible to compensate those who are 
displaced so that they are no worse off than before the change and still 
have money left over, which can be used for other.purposes. Of course, 
the desirability of such a shift in land use depends on whether such 
compensation is actually made and the form which.it takes. 
It seems reasonable to assume that the present use of the land in 
Pumwani will.-not-be optimal in the long run. It is certain that higher-
value uses than relatively low-density low-income housing can be found for 
the land. Fairly high density high-income housing, commercial, or 
industrial uses are bound to be superior from a standpoint" of resource alloca-
tion. At present, the-city council is the owner of this land. How can it 
ensure that the land is put to best use? There are two principal methods 
available. One is to offer the land at auction or by tender to the highest 
private bidder who will then be free to use the land as he sees fit(subject 
to zoning.laws). The land can either be conveyed as freehold or in the form 
of a lease for a specified duration. 
The individual or firm that can find the highest-valued use for the 
land will be able and willing to make the highest bid for it. If the 
auction or tender is well advertised and truly competitive, there is 
assurance that the land will be used to its best advantage. Not only will 
the land be efficiently used under such a scheme, but-the city council will 
also receive the maximum revenue possible. This can be used to.compensate 
the former occupants. There will still be a surplus which can be put to 
other uses. 
Second, if city council wishes,to retain direct control of the land 
it should then determine the highest-value use of the land, build those 
facilities and rent them to the highest bidders. If there are some users 
who are deemed especially deserving from a social standpoint (such as low 
income persons, elderly and infirm individuals, hospitals, community centers, 
etc.) a specific subsidy should be granted to those users. The subsidy 
should not be generally available to all classes of potential users, as 
happens when a single price- below the rna::ket clearing price is set. 
Furthermore, it should be carefully determined that there are no less costly 
means of providing for these specially deserving persons or institutions. 
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The present Pumwani redevelopment scheme is suspect on two counts. 
First, it is not.clear that the proposed pattern of use is that of highest 
potential value. Second, and most important, there is evidence that the 
city council will not reap the.highest possible return from the facilities 
it is proposing to construct. Already more applications have been received 
for these units than there will be units. The existence of a waiting list 
is prima facia evidence that the rentals and selling prices of these units 
are too low. (This criticism applies generally to all city council dwelling 
units.) There will be some administrative procedure devised to allocate 
these units among applicants.. This procedure will serve to bestow implicit 
subsidies on those who arc fortunate to be chosen. There is no evidence 
to suggest that those chosen will be more deserving of such subsidy than 
those who are not chosen (in fact the reverse is likely to be the case.) 
Not only will the distribution of subsidy not necessarily be appropriate 
but fewer total resources will become available to the city council to 
pursue other goals — the paramount one should probably be to provide 
housing for low income persons. 
This relates directly to the second problem -- what should be done 
with and for the present residents of Pumwani. There are two classes of 
individuals who must be considered; landlords and tenants. The latter are 
perhaps easier to deal with. Appropriate compensation for these individuals 
should take the form of ensuring that dwelling units are made available 
on terms that are no less favourable to them than the existing arrangements 
in Pumwani. It is no less necessary to ensure that these alternative 
dwelling units should be ready for occupancy by the time, the existing 
Pumwani houses are due to be vacated. Since the appropriate location of such 
housing will be less convenient than Pumwani, the rents for similar 
accommodation will have to be lower than Pumwani rents to compensate for 
the higher transport costs that will be incurred in the new location. 
This can be done through city council's building appropriate low cost 
units for these people. Since Pumwani rents are presumably set by the 
working of the market this means that in general the new units should be 
built to a standard that allows them to be profitable to city council at 
5 a market clearing price. 
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Compensation"of landlords provides a more complex situation* Part 
of their present incomes from Pumwani property arises from their good 
fortune in having been able" to" obtain plots at less than' their value , and 
thereby appropriate some of the land rent for themselves. There is no 
reason to feel that they should be compensated for this loss unless the 
city council intends' them-to continue receiving a subsidy. Compensation 
may be granted in the form of a•lump sum cash payment which should be the 
appropriate capitalized value of the stream of rents that they would have 
continued to receive from the structures (and land if it is decided to 
compensate them for the loss of the '''windfall") had redevelopment not taken 
place. Alternatively, they could be compensated through the provision of 
plots in a new location at terms which differ from the market value of the 
plots by the amount of compensation coming to them. (This may result in 
some cash payment being required for the plot or may consist of a plot 
plus some cash). A credit scheme may also be called for to provide the 
immediate resources needed to build new dwelling units but there is no 
need for these terms to be concessionary. 
One complication arises here. There is some evidence that some 
rentals paid in the present Pumwani area are lower than they would be in a 
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free market. It is likely that this arises largely from landlords granting 
implicit subsidies to family members or specially deserving persons such 
as the sick and aged. If this is the case, it means that the dichotomy 
between landlords and renters is not complete. Some of the gains to 
landlords have been redistributed to tenants and this should be taken into 
account in devising compensation schemes. 
So far this paper has talked only in "cold hard economic terms." 
The "Report of the Working Party" rightly laid great emphasis that Pumwani 
is a living functioning community that provides many services for its 
members above and beyond those that can be measured in terms of rents and 
property values. Many of these benefits cannot be bought in markets with 
money. Therefore, there is great need to consider these factors in any 
redevelopment or rehousing scheme for these people. Is it not possible 
to rehouse this group in a manner in which will retain most of the values 
of the existing social organization? It would seem that with sufficient 
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7 planning effort the answer could, be affirmative. 
The public•shouid be grateful to the committee that compiled "The 
Pumwani Report" for clearly'outlining the situation as it exists at 
present and drawing attention to the fact that the present redevelopment 
scheme will fail to provide rehousing for the inhabitants of the area. 
However, it is not clear that either of the alternative schemes proposed 
by the committee (upgrading of existing structures directly by City Council 
or through loans to existing plotholders) will provide a satisfactory 
solution to the problem. First of all, the proposed renovations are 
expected to justify 50 per cent increases in rent. Will the present tenants 
be willing to pay this much more for rent, given their incomes? Furthermore, 
there is a strong case that continued use of this land for low-standard 
housing is inefficient for the city as a whole. The crux of the problem is 
that the present plan neither provides compensation for existing tenants nor 
obtains as much as it could from the better-off persons who will benefit 
9 
from the scheme. Thus it appears that a third alternative, for the Council 
to derive the maximum return from the land and buildings it is providing 
in Pumwani and use the receipts to compensate tenants and provide more 
low-cost housing in Nairobi would be.superior on grounds of both economic 
efficiency and equity.10 If the maximum return is obtained by the council there 
will be sufficient resources immediately available to carry out adequate 
compensation. 
IV. CITY COUNCIL HOUSING SCHEMES -AND POLICIES: SOME CRITERIA 
This analysis has implications for city-council housing schemes in 
general. The housing problem in Nairobi is principally a lack of sufficient 
housing units appropriate for low income persons. The best way to solve 
the problem is to increase the stock of such dwelling units as quickly as 
possible. If city council charges what the market will bear on all of its 
units (the existence of waiting lists or vacancies give an accurate guide 
to whether or not this condition is realized) the maximum amount of resources 
will become available to the council for expanding the stock of housing. 
(Of course, as the stock of housing expands the market clearing rents will 
fall, thereby benefitting tenants and slowing the rate of housing expansion 
unless council borrows to continue the programme at some high rate ..) - If 
it wishes to make plots available for private building which will increase 
the total flow of resources into the housing sector, it should charge the 
maximum price or rental for the plots that can be obtained through tender 
or auction. If it wishes to subsidize certain groups it should do so 
deliberately by granting units or plots on concessionary terms. It should 
not be dismayed if the recipients of such largesse in turn sell the plots 
or sub-let the housing units at a profit. The goal of subdidization will 
have been realized in these cases just as well as when persons use the 
plots or housing units as intended by the council — they will have received 
a grant of additional real income. 
There is a possible counterargument to this. It may be felt that 
housing standards have important effects on health and social accommodation 
to an urban setting that are not fully realized by consumers. That is, 
public authorities may have reason to believe that individuals do not 
properly understand what is best for them and that they should therefore 
by forced or induced to enjoy a higher standard of accommodation than they 
are prepared to pay for. This does provide a case for housing subsidy 
and prohibition of selling these subsidy rights. 
However, it appears to the writer that the more rapid expansion of 
housing arising from city council maximizing its revenue from housing and 
land transactions will lead to higher standards of housing for more people 
at lower rents in the shortest possible period of time. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The basic argument of this paper is quite simple. The Nairobi 
housing problem is principally the result of'too few housing units of 
standards appropriate for very low-income persons. The council should 
pursue policies that will cause the stock of such housing units to be 
expanded as rapidly as possible. By charging full market rents for 
council units and selling or leasing land at the highest possible prices, 
the maximum amount of resources will accrue to the council for vigorously 
pursuing low-cost housing programme. 
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FOOTNOTES 
" Visitihg'Rfesearch FellowInstitute for Development Studies, University 
Collegej Nairobi, on leave from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
I am grateful to the - Rockefeller Foundation for financial support. 
Helpful comments were 'received on an earlier draft from Frank Mitchell 
and Emil Rado. -'• However, they are absolved of all remaining errors of 
ommission and commission. 
1. National Christian Council of Kenya, "Praswani Redevelopment" (report 
of a Working Party, meeting at St. John's Community Centre, Nairobi, 
1968-69, mimeo. ri'.d.) p. 5. This report will subsequently be referred 
to as' "The Pumwani Report." 
2. Ibid, p. 10 
3. It might be useful to examine this famous waiting list in more detail. 
Does it mean that there are 30,000 homeless persons walking the streets 
unable to find housing or imposing on relatives for accommodation? It 
is highly unlikely that persons in these categories appear on the list 
at all and it is significant to note that persons now receiving alloca-
tion of city council houses placed their names on the list in the early 
1950's. The significance of the list is that* given present city 
council rents compared to private market rents, there are 30,000 
families that would prefer to move out of their present housing units 
into cheaper and better accommodations afforded by the council. Little 
can be learned about the general adequacy or inadequacy of housing in 
Nairobi from the number of persons on the list. What can be learned 
is whether or not city council rents are above or below the market-
determined rents. If city council rents were cut by 50% the waiting 
list might well swell to 70,000 families on the list, while if they 
were raised above market rents, the waiting list would vanish and 
council units would lie vacant. If council rents were just equal to 
equilibrium private rents,, there would be no waiting list for any 
particular standard 'or type of unit, neither would" there be any vacant 
units. Obviously, rents, and hence rates of return, to different 
standards and types of units will differ. This will provide a guide 
to the types of units that deserve greatest priority for expansion. 
'4. M.A. Tribe, "Patterns of Urban Housing Demand in Uganda,'' East African 
Economic Review, IV, 1 (June 1968) pp. 35-50, reports that in Kampala 
private renters had an average monthly income of shs. 484/- while 
tenants in municipal estates earned shs. 577/- per month on average. 
On the other hand average rental paid per room was shs. 45/- by private 
renters and shs. 25/- per room in municipal estates. The result is 
that private renters spent on average 14.1 per cent while tenants in 
municipal estates spent only 7.0 per cent of their incomes on rent. 
The corresponding figures for Entebbe are 12.1 and S.4 per cent. The 
situation in Mbale was reversed; private renters spent-10.8 per cent 
and municipal estate tenants 11.3 per cent of income on rent. It 
should be noted that government employees occupying official quarters 
in Kampala spent only 4.3 per cent of income on rent; in Entebbe and 
Mbale the figures were 2.0 and-2,5 per cent. 
Although we do not have comparable' current data available for 
Nairobi, an unsystematic examination of available information suggests 
that the situation is quite comparable to that in Kampala or,' if 
anything, the rent-income ratios will diverge to a greater extent 
between private renters and municipal housing tenants 
Tribe is very explicit about the perverse redistribution of income 
that occurs as a result of municipal rental policies (p. 46). 
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5. Acceptance of this criterion may well reveal that under present 
building: codes, architects will be. unable, to design houses-that ..can 
be built and...rented at,the necessary level of rents without any overt 
or covert subsidy. If this the case it suggests that much thought must 
., be given. %o .revising building standards and design that are considered 
acceptable, for the city. One of the advantages of "planned squat" 
schemes is that individuals, if allowed, will provide units of lower 
physical' standard than the council is prepared to build directly, yet 
these units may well be better suited to the economic needs of the 
people concerned. 
Another common.fallacy that must be put to rest is that if the council 
is able to borrow money from the CDC or World Bank at 7%, the appropriate 
rent is that which will recover the capital of the project with a 7% 
rate of return. If at market rents the council can reap a return of 
40% on capital for which it only pays 7% so much the better for the 
council and society.: It has been fortunate to be able to borrow so 
cheaply.. The high rate of return will mean that the loan can be repaid 
and that, a large surplus will accrue to the council that then expands 
the capital available for more investment in housing. Housing expansion 
should be pursued until market rents yield only the level of return 
that can be obtained.in alternative investment projects. It is absolute 
nonsense to equate an "economic rate of return" with the somewhat 
concessionary rate at which public bodies are able to borrow.,. Similarly, 
if council wants to encourage private building, it can borrow fuhds at 
'7% and lend them with mortgage.rates far in excess of this amount. 
This too will increase the total pool of funds available for further 
lending. That study makes clear that part of the functioning and 
organization of a community is dependent on its physical location. For 
instance, many of. the social ties and relationships that make Pumwani a 
community may. well cut across the borders of the. redevelopment area into 
adjacent areas. Furthermore, many income generating activities in Pumwani 
such as petty trading are dependent on proximity to the central city. 
It may be very difficult to preserve this community and structure of 
occupational opportunities in a. new setting; matters which are not to 
be taken lightly. 
Yet it is true that if Pumwani rentals are market-determined most, if 
not all, of these locational advantages will be appropriated by plothold-
ers in the form of rents. Thus it is the landlord who has most to 
' lose from redevelopment — he stands to lose a substantial implicit 
subsidy arising from his good fortune.in having obtained a Pumwani plot. 
The possibility still remains for the. Council to compensate all residents 
and plotholders fully and still gain resources for other uses by making 
more rational use of the Pumwani site. However, close attention must be 
paid to social as well as. economic factors in determining compensation 
criteria and programmes. 
6. "Pumwani Report," op.pit, p. 15.. 
7. Peter Marris, Family and Social Change in an African City.,. (London: 
Routledge. 8 Kegan Paul, 1961) contains an excellent account .of. one rehousing 
scheme in Lagos. ** ( Gr/i-frV be./o^>) v 
8. "Pumwani Report," op. ci.t. , p.. 12 . .. . . . 
9. Ibid. p. 10.. The, report, is distressingly vague on the-expected returns 
to be gained by purchasers, of the new units .but one can infer, rates of 
return between 25 and;50 per cent-per annum from the data provided. 
Certainly the fact that applications received exceed the number of units 
available is sufficient proof that the Council is not.charging; as much 
as it could. . 
>'* This, however, is easier said than done. Experience with urban renewal 
schemes in the UK and US suggests that communities have not been preserved 
despite occasional pious expressions of intent to do so. It is a very 
difficult problem indeed but one must preserve the hope that if planners 
are sufficiently concerned about the problem, solutions can be found. 
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10. It is interesting to note that the "Farnworth Report" (quoted on 
p. 13 of"The Pumwani Report" op. cit.) stated "THERE IS NO LEGAL 
OBLIGATION ON COUNCIL TO GIVE PREFERENCE TO STAKEHOLDERS" (p. 3); 
and that "THE COUNCIL HAS VERY LITTLE IF ANY MORAL OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE FO 
FOR THE STANDHOLDERS AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER SECTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY" 
(p. 5). 
